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Abstract 
 
The relations of the European Union (EU) with Africa are increasingly spreading 
beyond the domain of humanitarian and development cooperation. The continent’s 
growing potential is producing vast webs of interlinkages in the realms of energy and 
commerce, among others. At the same time, such interdependencies bring with 
them increased vulnerabilities to insecurity on the continent. Nigeria exemplifies such 
a dilemma. The country has just taken the top spot as Africa’s largest economy. Of 
late, however, violent Islamic extremism ravages the north of the country, 
threatening the stability of one of Europe’s foremost energy suppliers and a growing 
trade partner. Thus, this paper sets out to uncover the EU’s response to such a crisis, 
as well as examining the factors lying behind this response. While the study argues 
that the issue is potentially ‘Europeaniz-able’ from a member state perspective, 
deep engagement is seen to be held back by the absence of an effective entry 
point for securitization with this important ally, as well as the intractability of the EU’s 
purported multi-functional approach to the idiosyncrasies of the conflict in question, 
in which not only transnational terrorist groups, but also the central government are 
centrally implicated in deepening insecurity. 
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“Only a few have sown the wind, but that wind 
was fanned by the breath of appeasement. Only one 
choice remains; to ride, or else reap, the whirlwind.”  
 
Wole Soyinka, Nigerian Nobel Laureate1 
 
Introduction 
 
A diffuse insurrection is currently unleashing a wave of extremist attacks in the north 
of Nigeria, targeting schoolchildren, women, public and religious figures alike. This 
campaign of savagery has being on-going since 2009, with 2014 seeing a major 
increase in indiscriminate, brutal assaults. So far costing over 4,000 lives 2 , a 
catastrophic humanitarian crisis is now affecting over 3 million civilians3 in a country 
that is home to the highest concentration of impoverished people in Africa.4 Nigerian 
President Goodluck Jonathan has made repeated calls for increased European 
assistance to counter the insurgency.5 While neighbouring Chad, Niger and Mali are 
the focus of a dedicated European Union (EU) Sahel strategy, and Brussels pays 
heavy attention to combatting on-going crises in the nearby Central African 
Republic and the Gulf of Aden, Nigeria languishes at the bottom of the list of EU aid 
contributions, receiving the lowest share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
per capita in Africa.6  
On the one hand, Nigeria is regularly viewed in humanitarian and developmental 
terms. Geographic distance and economic insignificance traditionally meant that 
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa typically had no direct implications for Europe 
beyond ethical considerations. But on the other hand, April 2014 saw Nigeria officially 
overtake South Africa to become the continent’s biggest economy.7 In combination 
with its hegemonic status in the West-African sub-region, its role as Africa’s largest oil 
producer as well as its most populous nation,8 this latest crown paves the way for 
Nigeria’s positioning as a significant actor in global relations. Relatedly, emerging 
multipolarity, greater global pressure on energy resources and rapidly expanding 
African economies have seen the region shoot up the European foreign policy 
                                                 
1 W. Soyinka, “The Butchers of Nigeria”, Newsweek, 16 January 2012. 
2 International Crisis Group, “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency”, 
Brussels, ICG Africa Report, no. 216, April 2014, p. i. 
3 BBC, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Insurgency ‘Affects Millions’”, BBC World News, 26 March 2014. 
4 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators”, Washington, DC, The World Bank Dataset, 
2014. 
5  B. Agande & I. Shaibu, “Jonathan Seeks Foreign Assistance to Tackle Boko Haram”, 
Vanguard, 20 April 2012. 
6 Author’s own calculations, derived from The World Bank, op. cit. 
7 Y. Kale, “Measuring Better: Rebasing/Rebenchmarking of Nigeria’s GDP”, Abuja, Nigeria 
National Bureau of Statistics, 6 April 2014. 
8 E. Karmon, “Boko Haram’s International Reach”, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 8, no. 1, 2014, 
p. 79. 
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agenda in the “new scramble for Africa”. 9  Such increased interest in Africa’s 
potential corresponds with greater vulnerability for the Union. Terrorist bombings 
inside their own borders over the last decade awoke Europeans to the fact that 
external crises can likewise be internal crises; expanding interlinkages through 
technology, trade, and migration now render insecurity less constrained by 
Westphalian borders. Thus, the positioning of Nigeria at the interface of two extremes 
– that of high potential and that of severe instability – forms the departure point for 
this paper. The research that follows was prompted by the observation that limited 
consideration has been devoted to occasions where internal crises break while 
external indicators flourish. With Nigeria as a clear case in point, it sets out to uncover 
the extent to which the EU is engaging with the issue of insecurity in the North, as well 
as the factors that explain this degree of engagement.  
Following an overview of the Boko Haram insurgency, this paper moves to examine 
European interests and activities in the country. On the basis of these findings, the 
research then turns to analyse the current level of engagement. In doing so, it puts 
forward the argument that, rather than preferences of key member states standing 
in the way of a process of ‘Europeanization’ vis-à-vis Nigerian security, securitization is 
in fact held back due to an absence of appropriate entry points for such a process. 
This is seen to demonstrate the limits of the EU’s proclaimed comprehensive 
approach in dealing with atypical conflicts of deep complexity.  
 
The Rise of a Whirlwind 
 
This section outlines the evolution of the Boko Haram threat against the backdrop of 
the post-colonial Nigerian state, including brief overview of international responses to 
the insurgency. 
 
A Country Divided 
Present-day Nigeria is more or less an artificial alliance of over 250 different ethnic 
groups, amalgamated in 1914 by the British administration.10 Commentators point to 
colonial divide-and-rule strategies, engendering uneven socio-cultural, economic 
and political development between northern and southern protectorates, as a 
                                                 
9 P. Carmody, The New Scramble for Africa, London, Polity, 2011. 
10 O. Uzoechina, “’State Fragility’ and the Challenges of Development in West Africa”, ALC 
Research Report, no. 3, 2008, pp. 35-36. 
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contributing factor to destabilizing tensions today. 11  Significant unrest between 
Muslims and Christians over political power is now a recurrent feature.12 
Exacerbating such struggles are the massive resource rents that the state has 
accrued. Poor management of such wealth has acted as a persistent conflict 
accelerator, where large scale corruption, kleptocracy and ‘Dutch Disease’ 
syndrome often lead to serious dissent aimed at rectifying allegedly unfair national 
distributions of revenue.13 Such inequities are seen to disproportionately neglect the 
development needs of the Muslim north. Figures from 2011 demonstrate that while 
27% of Christians live below the poverty line in Nigeria, 72% of Muslims find themselves 
in such a margin.14 It is thus no surprise that vast swathes of the northern populace 
view the state apparatus and its current southern representative, Goodluck 
Jonathan, as illegitimate. 15 Feeding on popular discontent related to unresolved 
social tensions and diminishing economic opportunities, Boko Haram’s 16  early 
incarnation under fundamentalist salafist mallam Mohammed Yusuf saw itself as a 
buffer to the mainstream political authorities,17 but was nevertheless a non-violent 
one when it emerged at the turn of the millennium.18  
 
A Feasible Insurgency 
Of late, Boko Haram has developed the means to sustain extended campaigns of 
mass violence through ideological outreach toward international jihadist groups, 
providing operational and logistical support to embolden the movement.19 Trans-
border links have furnished Boko Haram with new modalities with which to inflict 
suffering, rendered viable through lucrative resources courtesy of Al-Qaeda in the 
                                                 
11  M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 26. 
12 J. Lengmang, “The Upsurge of Religious Fundamentalism”, in G. Best (ed.), Religion and 
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan, John Archer, 2011, p. 101. 
13 Uzoechina, op. cit., p. 37.  
14 V. Thomson, “Boko Haram and Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria”, Global Security Studies, 
vol. 3, no. 3, 2012, p. 49. 
15  D. Agbiboa, “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective”, African 
Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, vol. 3, no. 1, 2013, pp. 144-157. 
16  In this thesis, Boko Haram, which translates as “Western Education is Forbidden” is 
understood as the collection of inter-linked Islamist insurgent groups in the north of Nigeria. 
Although it is recognised that break-away factions such as Ansaru exist, the nature of the 
network is such that it is ill-understood and such nuances are beyond the scope of this 
research. See International Crisis Group, op. cit., pp. 18-23. 
17 O. Bello, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threat: How the EU Should Act”, FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 123, 
Madrid, FRIDE, April, 2012, p. 3. 
18 D. Agbiboa, “The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the State”, 
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, no. 3, 2013, p. 4. 
19 O. Bello, “Quick Shift or Quicksand? Implementing the EU Sahel Strategy”, Madrid, FRIDE 
Working Paper, no. 114, November 2012, p. 14.  
Eleanor Friel 
7 
Maghreb (AQIM) as well as al-Shabaab.20 Such funding supplants revenue that the 
group derives from cross-border trafficking in illicit goods.21  
Furthermore, deep-seated incapacities at the heart of the federal government have 
played into Boko Haram’s hands.22 The governing apparatus in Abuja holds middle-
income status buttressed by vast oil reserves, and does not, perhaps, meet typical 
weak state criteria. But illusions of strength are dispelled by a deep gulf that exists 
between Nigerian society and the institutions of the federal state. This is particularly 
pronounced in the north. Ake’s comparison to Hobbes’ “pre-political state” that fails 
to “engender any legitimacy, even though it made rules and laws profusely” aptly 
captures the animosity and illegitimacy with which vast swathes of the populace 
view the ruling class.23 Such notions have been buoyed by repeated operational 
shortcomings. Since 2009, ambush tactics of Boko Haram have repeatedly caught 
national security agencies off guard.24 A belligerent, brutal ‘anti-terror campaign’ of 
state-perpetuated violence as well as an acknowledgment by the President that the 
police have been infiltrated by members of the sect exacerbates already high levels 
of insecurity and distrust of the state on the part of northerners.25  
 
International Attention 
While the organization has evolved into multiple, loosely affiliated groups, which 
complicates analysis, it is nonetheless possible to say that the primary targets of Boko 
Haram have, thus far, been their own countrymen. 26  However, the dramatic 
contextual shift that occurred at the international level after 9/11 means that along 
with much non-state violent activity, the northern Nigerian situation has come to be 
viewed through the securitized lens of the ‘war on terror’.27 Close by, fallout from 
Libya and Mali is feared to contribute to a globally threatening salafi-jihadi breeding 
ground in the Sahel, compounded by porous borders and vast, ‘ungoverned’ 
                                                 
20  International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Growing New 
Headache”, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 9, 2011, p. 3. 
21  D. Agbiboa, “No Retreat, no Surrender: Understanding the Religious Terrorism of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria”, African Study Monographs, vol. 34, no. 2, 2013, p. 67. 
22 J. Fearon & D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, American Political Science 
Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 2003, p. 80. 
23 Ake, op. cit., p. 3; Alozieuwa, op. cit., p. 2.  
24 Akinola, op. cit. 
25 M. Martinelli & U. Ilo, “Why the EU has a Stake in Nigeria’s Democracy”, Abuja, OSIWA, July 
2012; Human Rights Watch, ”Spiraling violence: Boko Haram attacks and security force 
abuses in Nigeria”, HRW Report, October 2012; Bello, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threat”, op. cit.; 
Bamgbose, op. cit., p. 128; Bello, “Quick Shift or Quicksand? Implementing the EU Sahel 
Strategy”, op. cit. p. 3. 
26 B. Gil-Schwandl, “A Tale of Two Jihads: Mali, Nigeria and the EU”, Working Paper, 13/26, 
Lisbon, Contraditório, June 2013.  
27 Serrano & Pieri, op. cit., p. 196. 
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spaces.28 Thus, the growing reach and sophistication of Boko Haram attacks means 
that the group is being seen by external observers to pose an existential threat to 
regional and Western interests.29 The recent approach of the US toward Nigeria and 
the wider Sahel is undoubtedly characterized by a counter-terrorism mind-set. 30 
Additionally, strong condemnation of the actions of Boko Haram has been expressed 
by the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and numerous international 
leaders.31 In response, increasing instances of anti-Western rhetoric in statements 
issued by the group have been recorded.32  
 
European Interests 
 
This section sets out the main areas of European interest toward Nigeria, both in terms 
of member states and in terms of the institutions of the Union, although there is often 
a certain degree of overlap. It seeks to illustrate that Europe has strong interests in 
Nigeria, and that these are multifaceted and multi-locational.  
 
Colonial Linkages and Diaspora Ties 
Historically, EU interactions with African states have often been channelled through 
the privileged relations of former colonial partners, which acted as a major 
component of leverage. 33 As the former colonial power, Britain has maintained 
favourable bilateral ties with Nigeria, now institutionalized under the 
Commonwealth. 34 Connections are viewed positively on both sides, with a 2009 
Afrobarometer survey reporting 60% of Nigerians felt that Britain was generally helpful 
to the country.35 Warm relations are deepened by strong diaspora links,36 with the 
                                                 
28 B. Eveslage, “Clarifying Boko Haram’s Transnational Intentions, Using Content Analysis of 
Public Statements in 2012”, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 7, no. 5, 2013, p. 51; Z. Elkaim, 
“Analysis: Resilient Boko Haram an Increasing Threat”, The Long War Journal, December 2013. 
29 J. Pham, “Boko Haram’s evolving threat”, Africa Security Brief, no. 20, Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, place??, April 2012, p. 20. 
30 US Congress, “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland”, Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, 30 November 2011, Washington, USG Printing Office; US Department of State, 
“Terrorist designations of Boko Haram commander Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi and 
Abubakar Adam Kambar”, Washington, Office of the Spokesperson, Press Release, June 
2012. 
31 Institute for Security Studies, “PSC Report Programme”, ISS Report, no. 31, Addis Ababa, 
February 2012. 
32 Adesoji, op. cit., p. 106. 
33 S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, London, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014, p. 124.  
34 G. Faleg, “United Kingdom: The Elephant in the Room”, in F. Santopinto & M. Price, (eds.), 
National Visions of EU Defence Policy, Brussels, CEPS Paperbacks, 2013, p. 137. 
35 Afrobarometer, Afrobarometer Online Data Analysis, retrieved 20 April 2014. 
36 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, “Extremism and political instability in 
North and West Africa-Written Evidence from FCO”, London, Stationary Office, 10 May 2013. 
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influence of “one of the biggest diaspora communities” in Europe acknowledged by 
Commission President Barroso. 37  Unsurprisingly, Nigerian migrants are a sizeable 
minority in the UK, but are also a prominent subgroup in member states such as Italy, 
Spain and Ireland where they represent almost 10% of the migrant community.38 
Thus, strong British-Nigerian relations, combined with the fact that the UK holds a 
relatively loud voice within the EU, firstly leads to the expectation that Nigerian 
interests are strongly represented at the European level. 
 
Development Cooperation 
Development cooperation is central to the EU’s identity as an external actor; 39 
fostering “the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty” is laid down in 
the Treaties as a stated objective of the Union. 40  Nigeria has the highest 
concentration of impoverished people on the entire African continent, with 115 
million people living below the extreme poverty threshold of $1.25 per day.41 Thus 
there is a clear case for EU developmental interests in Nigeria. Furthermore, EU 
development cooperation in Africa can be understood as a vehicle for spreading 
the values of the Union, such as democracy and stability,42 as well as to enhance its 
legitimacy and visibility.43  
That said, the status of the EU as a donor in Nigeria tends to be that of “development 
enabler”,44 in contrast to more prominent donor roles in neighbouring countries. ODA 
from the European Commission to Nigeria has fluctuated around €70 million per year 
over the last 5 years.45 To put such figures in perspective, however, Nigeria reported a 
                                                 
37 European Commission, “A Centenary to Celebrate in Union and Unity”, Speech given by 
José-Manuel Barroso at the Nigeria Centenary Conference, Abuja, 27 February 2014. 
38 Author’s own calculations, derived from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, Trends in International Migration Stock: Migrants by Destination and 
Origin, New York, United Nations, 2014. 
39 G. Le Pere, “AU-EU Security and Governance Cooperation”, in Adebajo & Whiteman, The 
EU and Africa, from Eurafrique to Afro-Europa, London, Hurst, 2012, p. 258. 
40 European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, C83, 30 March 2010, art. 21 TEU. 
41 The World Bank, op. cit. 
42  V. Adetula, D. Kew & C. Kwaja, “Assessing Democracy Assisstance: Nigeria”, World 
Movement for Democracy/FRIDE Project Report: Accessing Democracy Assistance, May 
2010, p. 2. 
43  M. Carbone, “International Development and the European Union's External Policies: 
Changing Contexts, Problematic Nexuses, Contested Partnerships”, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 26, no. 3, 2013, p. 487. 
44 Bello, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threat”, op. cit., p. 1. 
45 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “International Development 
Statistics Online Databases”, OECD Development Assistance Committee, April 2014. 
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GDP of €322 billion for 2012,46 meaning EU institutions contributed to 0.02% of the 
Nigerian economy that year. By contrast, the Commission’s ODA to neighbouring 
Niger represented 3.34% of the national budget. 47  Thus, while European officials 
might have a strong interest in Nigerian development cooperation, their relative 
muscle here is miniscule. At the same time it must be recognized that the Union’s 
development policies are a shared competence. Member state ODA contributions 
to Nigeria exceed that of the Commission, with the overwhelming bulk coming from 
the UK, and small sums transferred from Germany, France and Denmark, among 
others. 
Turning to the UK’s development cooperation toward Nigeria, increasing aid-based 
emphasis was placed on the region following the 1997-2010 Labour government’s 
‘pivot’ to Africa, notably through the establishment of the Department for 
International Development (DfID) as well as Tony Blair’s ‘Commission for Africa’ which 
aimed at stimulating new thinking on African development.48 The legacy of this era 
means that issues of development and aid have played a leading part in British 
relations with African countries.49  
 
Security 
Given its developmental interest, the EU also holds an inherent interest in Nigerian 
security, as its 2003 European Security Strategy purports that “security is a 
precondition of development”, in that “conflict makes normal economic activity 
impossible”. 50  This so-called ‘security-development nexus’ signals the growing 
importance of relations with African countries outside of strictly donor-recipient 
relationships, with European leaders of late stressing economic and political 
development as crucial to tackling global insecurity through the pursuit of ‘human 
security’.51 Thus the EU can be said to have an altruistic interest in Nigerian stability as 
a route to wellbeing in the country.  
EU interest in Nigerian security also reflects a strong desire for stable regional partners 
in terms of its own internal wellbeing. Challenges to peace in Nigeria and the wider 
Sahel region are a threat to the southern borders of Europe; illicit trafficking, energy 
                                                 
46 Kale, op. cit. 
47 Author’s own calculations derived from: World Bank, op. cit.  
48 A. Vines, “Africa and the United Kingdom: Labour’s Legacy, May 1997-May 2010”, in T. 
Chafer & G.C. Cumming (eds.), From Rivalry to Partnership: New Approaches to the 
Challenges of Africa, Farnham, Ashgate, 2011, p. 32. 
49 P. Williams, “Britain, the EU and Africa”, in Adebajo & Whiteman, op. cit., p. 357. 
50 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
12 December 2003, p. 2. 
51 R. Youngs, “Fusing Security and Development: Just another Euro-platitude?”, European 
Integration, vol. 30, no. 3, 2008, pp. 420, 430. 
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disruption and irregular migration originating in Nigeria all represent potential 
destabilizing forces to European security.52 The proliferation of extremist movements 
in Western and northern Africa moves the core of the terrorist threat closer to the 
borders of Europe. 53 Concerns are exacerbated by a global discourse depicting 
Africa as “the world’s soft underbelly for global terrorism”.54  
Within the EU, security in Nigeria is significant for a number of member states. Firstly, 
those on the southern frontier find themselves vulnerable to aforementioned risks due 
to geographic proximity. Secondly, explicit citing of “Britain, America, Israel and 
Nigeria” in videos released by Boko Haram’s leader in 2013 and references to 
Presidents Obama and Hollande in tandem with claims that operations will be 
directed at “the whole world” would suggest that France and the UK are on high 
alert. 55  Thirdly, member states are finding their attention drawn by growing 
incidences of kidnappings, with British, French, German, Greek and Italian nationals 
abducted by Boko Haram to date.56 A suicide bombing in Abuja’s UN headquarters 
in 2011, which claimed European victims,57 further drives home the nature of Boko 
Haram as more than simply a diffuse, latent menace to European states.  
 
Energy and Trade 
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the fourth largest exporter of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) globally.58 Furthermore, Nigeria consistently features in the top ten 
exporters of oil to the EU, largely to southern and western member states.59 44% of 
Nigeria’s oil exports go to Europe, with rates of export to the continent accelerating 
rapidly; 40% increases were recorded in both 2011 and 2012. 60  Commerce in 
machinery and foodstuffs is also significant. 61 
                                                 
52 Mattelaer, Simon & Hadfield, op. cit., p. 5. 
53  T. Renard, “Confidential partnerships? The EU, its strategic partners and international 
terrorism”, ESPO Working Paper, no. 4, European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, January 
2014, p. 8. 
54 US Congress, “Africa and the War on Global Terrorism”, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, 
USG Printing Office, November 2001, p. 6. 
55 Karmon, op. cit., p. 76. 
56 International Crisis Group, op. cit. 
57 F. Onuah, “UN Deputy Secretary General Visits Nigeria Bomb Victims”, Reuters, 28 August 
2011. 
58 US Energy Information Administration, “Nigeria Country Report”, 30 December 2013. 
59 Eurostat, “Energy, transport and Environment Indicators”, Luxembourg, Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2011. 
60 US Energy Information Administration, op. cit. 
61  European Commission, DG Trade, “European Union Trade in Goods with Nigeria”, 7 
November 2013. 
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In terms of member states, Spain and the Netherlands are the largest importers of 
crude oil from Nigeria. In addition, 12% of the UK’s crude oil imports currently come 
from Nigeria, with the House of Commons noting that price rises due to instability in 
Nigeria exerts considerable vulnerability on the country.62 Regarding LNG, Spain, 
France and Portugal are all major Nigerian clients. 63  Interestingly, despite weak 
historical links, Nigeria has become France’s largest African trading partner, with 
mutual investments of almost €6 billion in 2013.64 France has strong energy interests in 
the region; 80% of French electricity is provided through nuclear power, much of 
which runs on West African uranium.65 Equally, German-led plans to harness solar 
energy from across West Africa for export to Europe under the DESERTEC Foundation 
also have strong commercial interests in the region, and hence in stability in 
Nigeria.66 Several European multinational corporations play leading roles in Nigerian 
oil and gas sectors, including Royal Dutch Shell, Total and ENI. Furthermore, plans are 
afoot to bring natural gas from oil fields in the Niger Delta directly to Europe via the 
proposed ‘Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline’.67 Referring to a projected 8% per annum 
growth rate on a recent visit to Lagos, British Prime Minister Cameron described the 
Nigerian economy as a “dream waiting to happen”. 68  Steadily growing British 
investment in the country is reportedly set to approach €10 billion in 2014.69 Thus, 
especially in light of recent diversification pressures, the importance of Nigeria as a 
source of energy and potential growing market to a multitude of European 
constituencies cannot be overstated.70 
 
Regional Integration 
An interest more specific at the EU level is that of promoting regional integration. This 
is seen in an emphasis on multilateral institutions and regional organizations in a 
number of documents, including the Treaties and the European Security Strategy.71 
As a successful case of peace through regional integration in itself, the EU thus 
attempts to diffuse this model of security through backing policies such as economic 
                                                 
62 UK House of Commons, op. cit., p. 40.  
63 Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, “Foreign Trade Statistics 2012”, Abuja, NBS, no. 505, 
2012. 
64  M. Caldwell, “Security Worries Overshadow Nigerian Centenary”, Deutsche Welle, 27 
February 2014. 
65 Gil-Schwandl, op. cit., p. 19. 
66 Ibid., p. 17. 
67 US Energy Information Administration, op. cit. 
68 G. Akinsamne, “Cameron-Nigeria is a Dream Waiting to Happen”, This Day Live, 20 July 
2011. 
69 O. Obada, “Fighting Terrorism and Keeping the Peace: Interview with Nigerian Minister of 
Defence”, Worldfolio, April 2013. 
70 Bössner & Stang, op. cit., p. 1. 
71 Keukeleire & Delreux, op. cit., p. 300. 
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integration, common markets, and others that may indirectly impact regional 
security.72  
Consequently, given that much EU foreign policy toward Africa is foreign policy ‘by 
subvention’,73 the EU has a strong interest in ensuring the functioning of the regional 
organizations that it finances. In particular, the EU’s African Peace Facility channels 
funding to the AU and to the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) to support regional integration and regional stability. As the hegemon in 
the West African subsystem, Nigeria is a vital strategic partner for the EU, via the 
architecture of ECOWAS, headquartered in Abuja. 74  Nigeria has contributed 
immensely to peace operations in a variety of African conflicts, 75  and thus its 
leadership in the domain of regional security and integration is of crucial importance 
to the EU.  
 
European Activity in Nigeria 
 
Having examined general European interests in Nigeria, this section turns to look at 
what these mean in practice, with particular focus on the security realm. 
Incorporating analyses of documents as well as tangible activities, it hopes to lay the 
groundwork for ensuing analyses of Europeanization and ‘securitization’. 
 
Member State Activity in Nigeria 
Nigeria is the focus of strong attention from the UK. At the legislative level, the 
country has a dedicated All-Party Parliamentary Group, 76  and attention toward 
Nigeria has noticeably expanded at the very time when downsizing and cutbacks 
across the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DfID were occurring, but 
an exception was made for Nigeria on the grounds of population size and strategic 
interests.77 DfID now runs one of the largest aid programmes in the north of Nigeria,78 
hinting at incremental rapprochement of security and development activity. 
On a declaratory level, London has been resolute in supporting the federal 
government’s combat against extremism, although it increasingly expresses 
reservations about aspects of official ‘counter-terrorism’ policy.79 In 2011, Nigerian 
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media praised the UK’s reported preparedness “to provide any assistance [it] can to 
the UN and Nigerian authorities to bring those responsible to justice.” 80  Such 
pronouncements proved premature, as the FCO subsequently admitted that actual 
military assistance provided fell well short of what was requested by the federal 
government due to grave concerns over human rights transgressions by federal 
forces.81 Thus, while holding back in some areas, the UK has nevertheless cooperated 
with Nigeria on advice and assistance in the fields of anti-terrorist finance measures, 
judicial training and emergency counter-terrorism strategies.82 However, reservations 
prevail, allegedly on human rights grounds, about deeper engagement with the 
Nigerian military.83  
France is viewed to have taken on a leadership role in terms of security in the wider 
West African region.84 A 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security and its 
later revision point to strategic uncertainty associated with globalization and 
terrorism as a primary cause of concern, explicitly identifying Boko Haram and the 
decentralization of Al-Qaeda as key threats.85 Fallout from French actions in northern 
Mali have had a spill-over effect on the Nigerian situation, thus indirectly implicating 
France.86 Although its footprint is small, Paris does have a development cooperation 
programme with the country, spending €3.5 million in 2012.87 
Elsewhere, the Nigerian Ministry of Defence proclaims to have Memorandums of 
Understanding with its equivalent in many EU member states. 88  While President 
Jonathan has repeatedly called on member states such as Germany to support 
technical capacity in areas including intelligence gathering, responses have been 
hesitant.89 Italy has sent a special envoy to the region and strengthened bilateral 
relations toward Nigeria with a view to helping to tackle “terrorism, human trafficking 
and poverty”.90 Additionally, development spending has increased, with Germany 
and Denmark, among others, recently raising ODA levels for Nigeria. 91  On a 
diplomatic level, member states are strongly represented in Abuja, with nineteen 
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European embassies present. 92  In spite of this, security cooperation is not 
widespread. 
 
EU Activity in Nigeria 
On a declaratory level, recent EU discourse has seen a more comprehensive, 
equitable approach being taken toward African countries,93 evident in the 2007 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy’s (JAES) accentuation on security issues, joint action and 
continent-to-continent relations in all sectors beyond aid.94 The evolution of the EU’s 
security and counter-terrorism strategies over the same period95 highlights a growing 
recognition that the Union’s internal security rests on stability outside its borders.96 
However, in placing ‘human security’ as a central goal, the EU’s discourse positions 
referent objects of security as both states and individuals, inside and outside the 
Union alike. These objectives are not necessarily compatible, 97  as will be 
demonstrated below. EU-Nigeria relations centre on the 2009 ‘Joint Way Forward’ 
(JWF), through which both parties committed to enhance cooperation and dialogue 
at federal level, as well as through state and local governments.98 The elevation of 
relations beyond that of the basic Cotonou Agreement and JAES framework is seen 
as recognition of Nigeria’s growing importance. 99  While Bello denounces the 
document as a mere restatement of broad undertakings of the JAES,100 the JWF 
nonetheless drives home the point that EU-Nigeria relations go beyond development 
cooperation. 
In terms of instruments, at numerous points since independence, the EU has 
employed tools of diplomatic sanctioning toward Nigeria. Following good 
governance and human rights violations in 1993 and 1995, the Union suspended 
assistance and imposed restrictions,101 demonstrating a politically assertive manner. 
In the run up to the highly charged 2007 elections, the Union took the lead in 
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coordinating electoral assistance among donors.102 However, although lambasted 
by the head of the EU Election Observation Mission as the worst elections he had 
ever witnessed, 103  the EU remained uncritically committed to engagement, 
deepened thereafter through the 2009 JWF process, endeavouring to align EU efforts 
to the priorities of the federal government.104  
As regards financing, the EU has offered financing through the European 
Development Fund (EDF) since Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999, as well as 
funding good governance initiatives through channels such as the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. 105  However, EDF funds must be 
negotiated and co-managed directly with national authorities and cannot be 
disbursed on counter-terrorism efforts,106 effectively limiting the scope for manoeuvre 
between policy communities. 107  Conversely, the EU’s Instrument for Stability (IfS) 
allows for flexibility in situations of insecurity.108 Following a request from the Nigerian 
government for counter-terrorism assistance, the IfS assembled a short term response 
package for intelligence and training,109 in addition to €10 million to promote the role 
of Northern women in seeking peace and security in 2013.110  
In terms of institutional architecture, the bridging of security and development 
domains has undoubtedly been facilitated through the setting up of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), as well as the integration of Commission personnel 
and the EEAS under one double-hatted Head of Delegation. In Abuja, this has 
reportedly translated into an effective division of labour and good working 
relationship between policy communities. 111  Regarding dialogue, annual EU-
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ECOWAS talks tackle issues of common interest,112 while the JWF facilitates EU-Nigeria 
dialogue at multiple levels, with EEAS officials, at the Council of Ministers level, as well 
as dialogue at state governor and local government level.113 Moreover, party-to-
party dialogue such as the ‘Windhoek Meeting;’ continue apace, yet participants 
on both sides report Nigerian resistance to what is often viewed as European 
impositioning.114 Such political engagement is conceded to be a long-term process, 
through which “norms put down roots”, not necessarily yielding tangible short-term 
outcomes.115 
At the end of this section, it is clear that aside from the growing, albeit reticent, 
involvement of the UK, EU member states by and large are relatively unengaged in 
the security affairs of Nigeria. At the EU level, on paper the Union appears 
increasingly engaged on security issues, with relevant policy instruments and 
institutional structures seeming increasingly amenable to stability considerations. 
Nonetheless, the overall impression is one of a slightly disjointed, apolitical, albeit 
relatively equitable relationship between the EU and Nigeria. 
 
Is Nigeria ‘Europeaniz-able’? 
 
This section contends that engagement with security issues in Nigeria cannot be said 
to be hampered by a reluctance for the pivotal member states to Europeanize 
existing bilateral relations with Nigeria. On the contrary, the diffuse spread of Nigerian 
ties with Europe means that a large majority of member states have an active 
interest in the stability of the country. 
 
Europeanization 
The above sections demonstrate that numerous European states hold strong bilateral 
ties to Nigeria. In the past, it is alleged that such relations acted as a major constraint 
on EU foreign policy in that situations where member states’ former colonies were 
considered too sensitive, nationally, for EU-level deliberations. 116  However, the 
opposite often holds true at present, in that member states increasingly attempt to 
upload national foreign policy priorities to the European level through a process of 
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‘Europeanization,’ understood as the projection and pursuit of domestic foreign 
policy approaches and objectives at the EU level.117  
Security issues in Africa have been described as a field particularly conducive to the 
Europeanization of member state policies.118 At the same time, national approaches 
toward African conflicts are less than consistent. 119  The assertion that EU 
considerations on the issue are often driven by internal power relations has led some 
commentators to remark that the level of engagement with regard to a particular 
region or situation is determined primarily by the motives and preferences of the big 
states.120 This section seeks to investigate whether the security crisis in northern Nigeria 
is amenable to so-called Europeanization vis-à-vis national preferences. 
 
A French Obstacle? 
Firstly, in examining the role of France on the issue, it must be recognized that the 
country holds multiple, complex ties to a variety of regional actors across Africa 
owing to its colonial history, and is frequently portrayed as playing a “hyperactive 
diplomatic role.”121 Concurrently, France has been a primary proponent of a general 
process of Europeanization, demonstrated by continued and active support of all 
major EU security developments. 122 As the founder of the entire EU-ACP system, 
Gegout remarks that France is undoubtedly the most influential member state in this 
domain.123 Indeed, most major EU security initiatives toward Africa have come on the 
back of French proposals, such as the conception of the Strategy for Security and 
Development in the Sahel during the French presidency of 2008.124 Consequently, 
claims that Francophone Africa receives disproportionate attention from the EU are 
often put forward,125 including allegations that France “wants to favour its former 
colonies to the detriment of other developing states.” 126  The preponderance of 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions to francophone states could 
lend support to such claims.127 
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However, while there may be a degree of truth in the assertion that France is the 
primary driving force behind EU external action in Africa,128 it is no longer possible to 
say that French interests are restricted to its former colonies. Indeed, Jospin’s 
modernizing socialist reign from 1997 was keen to scale down France’s presence in 
Françafrique and to realign its strategic and diplomatic vision toward commercial 
interests.129 A concerted effort was likewise undertaken to dilute the French sphere of 
influence into a broader whole, encompassing a number of Anglophone African 
states, under the Zone de Solidarité Prioritaire programme in development 
cooperation.130 Such initiatives mean that France is paying ever-increasing attention 
toward Nigerian issues.131 
Economic interests are playing a growing role in French foreign policy in general,132 
and as its largest African trading partner, these interests are increasingly located in 
Nigeria. Strong French interest in Nigerian affairs was illustrated by the presence of 
François Hollande as guest of honour at the Centenary celebrations in 2014, during 
which the President declared: “We will always stand ready not only to provide our 
political support but our help every time you need it, because the struggle against 
terrorism is also the struggle for democracy.” 133 Thus, it becomes clear that any 
assertions holding France as the weak link in EU-Nigeria relations are no longer 
tenable given ever-strengthening interrelations between the two states.  
 
A British Hurdle? 
Along with France, the UK holds a pre-eminent status in matters of EU foreign 
policy.134 Therefore the question must be raised of whether a reluctance on the part 
of the UK to Europeanize relations with its former colony plays a part in determining 
the engagement of the EU with Nigerian affairs. While the Françafrique umbrella 
ensured that strong post-independence ties were generally maintained between 
France and its former territories, often considered the country’s chasse gardée,135 no 
such protection or exclusion can be said to characterize British attitudes toward its 
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former colonies, initially viewed as a “source of trouble rather than opportunity.”136 
This hands-off approach is evident through limited UK involvement in Africa during 
the Cold War, in contrast to that of France. Any notions of a UK-France rivalry are 
dispelled considering the 1998 signing of ‘Saint-Malo II’, which committed both sides 
to cooperative, harmonious policies toward Africa, and to promote an EU common 
position there.137 This synthesis was further enhanced with the creation of the Peace 
and Security Council and the EEAS, which has seen greater alignment and 
convergence of British and French policies toward African security issues.138 
As outlined above, the UK’s interest in Nigeria covers a broad spectrum of goals. 
British strategic and foreign policy objectives, insofar as they concern Nigeria, are 
largely consistent with those espoused by the EU in general. One reason for this is the 
active role that Britain has played in designing many of the relevant documents and 
strategies underpinning EU-Nigeria relations. Documents such as the European 
Security Strategy, and the EU Counterterrorism Strategy are largely British initiatives, 
and thus to some degree reflect British visions for EU foreign policy.139 London is said 
to view the EU as possessing added-value at the softer end of the security 
spectrum.140 Indeed, the comprehensive approach espoused by the EU in recent 
years is viewed as particularly compatible with the quest of the UK FCO for effective 
co-ordination.141 Thus, contrary to what is often supposed, the UK has been an active 
and positive influence from the outset on institutionalized European security 
cooperation. At the same time, more recent attitudes to EU security policy are 
tempered by pragmatic considerations underpinned by budgetary pressures on 
defence spending as well as frustration with bureaucratic complexities in Brussels.142  
As such, it is reasonable to assert that the UK is unlikely to proactively, single-
handedly push for stronger EU engagement in Nigeria at present. Neither, however, is 
it likely to object to a progressive Europeanization of relations with the country. 
Indeed the House of Commons’ evaluation of approaches to West Africa actively 
advocates the use of EU influence to shape approaches toward the region. 143 
Correspondingly, the establishment of the EEAS is generally viewed as helpful in 
plugging gaps in the UK’s African presence due to cutbacks under the 
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Comprehensive Spending Review. 144  Indeed, both the Brown and Cameron 
administrations have promoted burden-sharing among EU members as a means to 
maintain influence with African states.145 Such calls echo the ‘national projection’ 
facet of Europeanization, whereby national foreign policy often finds new 
opportunities to pursue objectives though the ability to resource-pool, burden-share 
and legitimize external efforts with the support of EU institutions and other member 
states.146  
 
Is Nigerian Security ‘Europeaniz-able’? 
As outlined earlier, a large majority of member states have strong interests in Nigerian 
stability and wellbeing, related to factors involving energy reserves, commercial 
interests, diaspora links and development cooperation. External EU strategies can be 
seen as a ‘win-win game’, and Nigeria is no exception here. EU institutions view them 
as an opportunity to draw member states into a more coherent approach, while 
member states can perceive them as a way to influence EU institutions.147 As such, 
the ability for relations between the EU and national foreign policy to represent a 
‘positive sum game’ arguably applies to the key member states’ approach vis-à-vis 
Nigeria.  
 
Platforms of Securitization 
 
Any discussion of securitization must give consideration to the object of security in 
question. Thus in examining the engagement of the EU on issues of insecurity in 
Northern Nigeria, it is important to examine the attention invested in respective levels, 
or platforms, of security, as well as the challenges that it faces in gaining traction on 
each platform. As such, this chapter will examine EU engagement in Nigeria at levels 
of human, state and regional security, respectively, and will in turn investigate the 
hurdles the EU faces in its pursuit of peace and stability at each platform. 
 
Human Security 
The concept of human security, while contested, shifts the focus to individuals 
instead of states, aiming “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that 
enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.” 148  As regards developing 
populations, human security arguably aims to equally advance the security interests 
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of outside actors.149 In this way, conceptions of human security overlap with those of 
a ‘security-development nexus’ through development programmes that increasingly 
aim at “bettering self-reliance in the interests of defending international society”.150 
EU development cooperation efforts directed at alleviating poverty and improving 
economic opportunity in northern Nigeria are thus viewed equally as an effort to 
enhance human security.  
The extent to which the EU addresses human security is at the outset limited by 
Nigeria’s status as a lower middle income country.151 As the EU moves to direct its 
focus on development assistance toward low-income fragile states, 152  Nigeria’s 
positioning outside this category means that aid plays an increasingly marginal role 
in its relationship with the EU. 
Juxtaposed against Nigeria, the EU faces insecurity issues in the Sahel that involve 
some of the world’s most economically and institutionally underdeveloped states. 
Here, while the allocation of resources toward the alleviation of human insecurity 
undoubtedly faces challenges, these can be characterized as having a more 
generic ‘developmental’ nature.153 Targeted action toward reducing poverty and 
enhancing economic growth in Niger and Chad takes place in contexts where the 
EU possesses leverage in terms of aid impact. Such fragile institutions and weak 
economies are arguably favourable to EU development cooperation and thus offer 
a conducive environment for effectively promoting human security. 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, the entry point for EU-Nigeria relations is the Minister 
for Planning, acting as coordinator at the governmental level.154 However, the JWF 
facilitates enhanced interaction with local government, civil society, the private 
sector and other non-state actors. 155  So given that EU engagement does not 
necessarily have to be channelled through the central government, it is arguable 
that this should allow for greater accessibility and leverage in the area of human 
security. A common theme involves promoting a multi-pronged socio-economic 
regeneration in the north of the country in order to break the vicious cycle of 
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inequality, economic stagnation and poverty blighting the region.156 For instance, in 
2013, EU grants of €89 million were directed at attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals, economic diversification and improved infrastructure, in effect 
aiming to advance human security.157  
While the EU undoubtedly holds good intentions and genuine commitment to 
promote human security, any interventions to this end are not facing into a social or 
political vacuum. Indeed commentators argue that the greatest threats to the 
requisite political promotion of human security on the part of the EU are found in 
national caveats in situations of relative institutional density.158 Northern Nigeria might 
not appear ‘institutionally dense’ to the European eye. However, many scholars of 
African studies point to the existence of deeply rooted frameworks of informal social, 
political and economic networks in peripheral regions that act to redistribute wealth 
and disseminate power,159 such as the Islamic systems of sultanates and caliphates in 
northern Nigeria. 160  These fundamental issues of economic, religious and social 
empowerment are easily overlooked; recent Afrobarometer polls demonstrate that 
60% of Nigerians perceive external partners as insensitive to issues of culture and 
society.161  
In addition to local-level understandings, overcoming vested interests is crucial to 
improving human security in Nigeria, and requires more than the simple transfer of 
development assistance from the EU in order to achieve desired results. Massive rents 
accrued through oil and associated kleptocratic practices mean that the “strong 
but unresponsive” nature of the official apparatus and its beneficiaries are as much 
part of the problem as they are of the solution.162 Nigerian lawmakers are among the 
highest paid in the world. 163  Moreover, far from depending on development 
assistance, it has been argued that a patrimonial segment of the country’s political 
system in fact feels threatened by it.164  
As such, proposed developmental strategies oriented toward human security 
improvements, such as the bolstering of community-based land management 
schemes and the provision of socioeconomic services will inevitably run into stiff 
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resistance from vested interests in northern Nigeria. 165  Effective change through 
necessary economic empowerment will require the redistribution of power from 
networks of control and patronage that are deeply entrenched across Nigeria and 
that incorporate state institutions. 166  Unqualified immunity afforded to senior 
politicians by the constitution 167 is just one manifestation of potential institutional 
impediments faced by external partners in the pursuit of development objectives. 
Much ODA directed toward this region, regardless of origin, is allegedly siphoned into 
the pockets of federal and state officials.168  
Technocratically-oriented modalities of the EU are thus argued to be ill-equipped to 
engage with the complexities of the Nigerian institutional environment, where the 
formal and legitimate intermingle with the informal and the illegitimate in a myriad of 
interconnected political and economic functions. Thus, regardless of altruistic aims, 
any attempt to improve human security in the Nigerian context will have to involve 
an enhanced understanding and adaptation to the specificities of the political and 
societal dynamics that must go beyond simple development aid allocation and 
formulaic dialogue. 
 
State Security 
In addition to targeting human security, the EU has re-established the centrality of 
state engagement after a period during the 1980s and 1990s when state structures 
were seen as an obstacle to development. 169  At present, the building of state 
capacities in terms of stable, inclusive governance and administrative structures is 
viewed as an integral part of addressing security and development, as outlined in 
the European Security Strategy and JAES. 170  In its assertions that development, 
security and good governance are mutually enhancing, the EU has become more 
emboldened in attaching conditionality to aid and trade agreements, ostensibly 
insisting that norms and practices which encourage good governance and human 
rights protection are observed at the state level.171  
Alongside an expanded focus on building stability at the state level, recent years 
have also seen the EU’s relationship with developing countries gradually becoming 
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less asymmetrical. Commitments to partnership and ownership are gaining increased 
emphasis, evident in the JWF,172 and particularly in the ‘roadmap’ that emerged 
from the EU-Africa summit in April 2014.173  This is viewed as owing to increased 
agency on the side of African partners. 174  Nigeria presents a particularly strong 
example of scales tipping to the south of the Mediterranean; the reasoning behind 
its non-involvement in the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is 
understood to be the document’s unilateral nature175 coupled with the reluctance of 
Nigerian authorities to engage in a heavily development-oriented strategy.176 Thus, in 
a situation of relative interdependence, the effectiveness of pursuing security and 
stability through the promotion of good governance at the state level is 
questionable. 
Now more than ever before, there is a growing realization by the EU that strategic, 
mutually beneficial engagement with resource-rich African states such as Nigeria is 
an urgent imperative.177 Moreover, any attempt on the part of the EU to engage in 
security-building relations at the state level in Nigeria must take into account the 
increased assertiveness of Nigeria and its allies on the international stage, especially 
with regard to negotiations in global fora and in the arena of trade politics. 178 
Indeed, an additional factor weighing on the mind of EU policy-makers at present is 
Nigeria’s non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2014-2015 term.179 
Thus, the ability and willingness to engage intensely in tackling insecurity at the state 
level in Nigeria falls victim to an ever-present tension in the EU; namely, that of 
internal versus external objectives.180 Specifically, the external aim to overcome the 
political disorder in a third country in this instance may be seen as antagonistic to the 
internal priority of maintaining good relations with strategic partners. This clash of 
interests is also recognized on the Nigerian side, where reservations have been 
expressed concerning potential collaborations with external actors in combatting 
Boko Haram. In a 2012 interview, referring to “foreign agents”, a former Nigerian 
Minister warned that: “When they come ostensibly for security, they have their own 
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agenda to penetrate our system and subjugate the sovereignty of the country”.181 
While the assertion that foreign agents have their own agenda rings true, 
accusations of dictating the Nigerian political agenda is arguably inapplicable to 
the EU’s efforts. Rather, the agenda of the EU would appear to prioritize stability at 
almost all costs, even to the detriment of democratic processes. 182  This a-
politicization is exemplified in the EU’s detachment from the flawed outcome of 
elections in 2007, described above. Thus, while the previous section on human 
security outlined institutions particular to Nigeria as an obstacle to the securitization 
of development policies, this section underscores the limits of the EU’s inclination to 
securitize relations with the state as resulting from internal self-interest.  
 
Regional Security 
The third platform on which the EU can be said to seek to engage in security and 
conflict transformation is at the regional level, that is, in pursuing stability across the 
wider West African region. As set out above, the EU holds a deep interest in 
promoting strong regional institutions as a route to achieving security. European 
support to the security architecture of ECOWAS and the AU is correspondingly 
underpinned by the JAES and Cotonou mantra of ‘African solutions to African 
problems’.183 EU efforts to build regional security capacity are evident in its financing 
of numerous multilateral approaches, including the UN peacekeeping budget,184 as 
well institutions working directly on Nigerian security concerns such as the African 
Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism, mandated to advance the 
implementation of a counterterrorism framework by the AU.185  
Moreover, ECOWAS has long been one of the EU’s privileged regional partners.186 
The EDF’s 2007-2013 Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) devoted almost €550 
million to deepening regional integration and stability, which demonstrates the 
significance that the EU places on building the capacity of ECOWAS. The EU has also 
funded AU and ECOWAS security efforts in West Africa outside of RIPs, for instance, 
the ECOWAS mission in Côte d’Ivoire (French acronym MICECI) and the ECOWAS 
mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) obtained EDF reserve funding.187 Additionally, the African 
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Peace Facility and IfS have financed ECOWAS mediation efforts in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea and Niger, along with a €50 million contribution to the African-led 
International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) in 2013.188 
Thus, it is clear that through its assistance to regional and multilateral programmes in 
West Africa, the EU has a general tendency to engage at this level in its efforts to 
tackle insecurity. However, any consideration of the West African sub-region must 
take account of the fact that Nigeria is the essential leader there, playing a 
stabilizing role both bilaterally, as well as through the ECOWAS architecture. 189 
Nigeria’s status as the organization’s lynchpin is underscored by the fact that it 
furnishes almost a third of the budget of the 15-member group.190 Furthermore, the 
country has a large defence budget, spending approximately €15 billion in the 
period 2010-2015,191 and it has been instrumental in past peace operations in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone.192  
Thus, to address recurrent security concerns in West Africa, the EU has heretofore 
relied heavily on its ally Nigeria as an effective hegemon in ECOWAS. Indeed it 
continues to depend on the country’s regional security power in terms of the 
successful realization of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea strategies. Furthermore, the 
EU is highly conscious of its regional economic role; Nigeria has repeatedly hesitated 
on a final ratification of the Economic Partnership Agreement designed for West 
Africa.193  
Therefore, the ability of the EU to effect change in the Boko Haram situation is clearly 
complicated by the complex involvement of its anchor ECOWAS state in this conflict. 
Indeed, Youngs remarks: “The EU has placed significantly more emphasis on Nigeria’s 
leadership of African peacekeeping than on the country’s own need for security 
governance reform.”194 The internal crisis in Nigeria not only threatens the ability of 
the county to act in its neighbourhood, it also undermines the country’s standing.  
Uzoechina comments: “Nigeria contributes immensely to peacekeeping in parts of 
Africa”, while “keeping the peace at home remains elusive”.195 So the fact that the 
regional hegemon is deeply embroiled in its own internal crisis means that a favoured 
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option of the EU, that is, instrumentalizing the power of Nigeria via ECOWAS in order 
to pursue security goals, is clearly off the table in this instance. This means that a 
major entry point through which the EU frequently seeks to tackle insecurity is 
rendered unavailable. 
 
An Atypical Crisis 
 
In response to crises, the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ proclaims to have a “wide 
array of policies, tools and instruments at its disposal […] spanning the diplomatic, 
security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid 
fields”. This section will expound the view that EU engagement with Nigerian 
insecurity is impeded by the intractability of an atypical crisis to the EU’s instrument-
driven approach. 
 
A Complex Insurrection 
In response to crises, the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ proclaims to have a “wide 
array of policies, tools and instruments at its disposal.”196 This paper, however, argues 
that EU engagement with Nigerian insecurity is impeded by the intractability of an 
atypical crisis to the EU’s instrument-driven approach. 
Firstly, in terms of grievances, a West African expert on regional insecurity interviewed 
for this study describes the fundamentalist movement’s original incarnation as 
“hijacked” by those with a political agenda. 197  Thus, complicating concerns 
regarding jihadism, extreme violence and humanitarianism, is the overtly political 
tone of the insurgency. Many are said to feel outraged by the instatement of 
southern Christian Jonathan as President on the death of northern Muslim Yar’Adua, 
seen to violate the terms of the rotational presidency practice.198 Indeed, certain 
voices allege the true aim of Boko Haram is to ensure that power returns to the north 
in the upcoming presidential elections in 2015.199 Other commentators such as Nobel 
Laureate Soyinka paint a more radical scenario: “Their aim is to bring society to its 
knees, to create a situation of total anarchy that will either break up the nation or 
bring back the military.”200 
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Secondly, regardless of their true ends, attention certainly must be paid to the 
group’s means. One the one hand, northern Nigeria is home to ideological 
movements in the form of religious fundamentalism, ethno-nationalism and youth 
organizations. Yet on other hand, organized crime, human, narcotic and arms 
trafficking are operated in the region as highly profitable activities. Both categories 
can be mutually reinforcing and are often deeply interconnected.201 Thus, from an 
external perspective, it is extremely difficult to distinguish genuine, grievance-based 
movements from entrenched elements motivated by profit-making opportunism.  
A third layer of complexity, touched on above, lies in the weak state capacity in 
northern regions. The challenge of addressing the movement inside Nigerian borders 
is compounded by the accessibility of vast swathes of the Sahel, from which Boko 
Haram can operate as a source of strategic depth. Furthermore, as a conflict zone 
itself in terms of AQIM and Tuareg movements, as well as a transit area for criminal 
traffickers, cross-border activity of Boko Haram in effect poses an exponential 
threat.202 Thus, the dearth of official governance in the north of Nigeria along with 
porous borders not only renders the group’s activities more difficult to trace and to 
tackle, it also risks further destabilizing neighbouring areas.203  
 
The EU Is Ill-equipped to Deal with Boko Haram’s Complexity 
Firstly, as regards any response to the political grievances of the group, democracy 
assistance by the EU has generally concentrated on support for the electoral process 
in Nigeria, as outlined earlier. Indeed, many Nigerians express frustrations at 
reductionist conceptions of democracy by donors, including the EU, who are seen to 
exaggerate the role of elections in democratic development, overlooking the 
imperative to improve democratic integrity.204 Bello describes further EU initiatives 
such as educational improvement, support to energy reform, arms control, justice 
sector overhaul and intelligence upgrades as largely addressing symptoms of 
political dysfunction in Nigeria, and criticizes a reluctance by the EU to confront the 
root causes, such as the interruption of the presidential rotational arrangement.205 
Secondly, concerning the remunerative aspect of Boko Haram’s operations, the EU’s 
purported comprehensive approach again falls short here. The EU Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy barely mentions Africa, and is relatively quiet on confronting the profit-
based component of insurrectionist activity, demonstrating a certain disconnect 
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from broader EU external action.206 The EU has made advances in terms of quelling 
formal funding to extremists, for instance in freezing assets of international terrorist 
enterprises, as well as pressuring multinational corporations to reform supply chains.207 
But less progress has been made by the EU in stemming flows to more localized 
extremist movements. The fact that Boko Haram relies heavily on kidnapping and 
trafficking to illegitimate markets means that similar interventions are not applicable 
to this variety of viability. This is not to say that the EU is not active in the fight against 
organized crime and illicit trafficking in West Africa; the most recent RIP supports 
ECOWAS counternarcotic efforts, along with EU dialogue on the issue.208 Rather, the 
crux of the problem here seems to be understanding and intelligence, where links 
between extremists and criminal trafficking have not been fully identified, thus 
hindering the implementation of joined-up, comprehensive responses.209  
Finally, the EU faces further dilemmas in responding to gaps left by the weak state 
presence in the region. Effective halting of insurgent mobility and stemming of 
criminal flows inevitably requires improved policing and boundary management. 
International partners can play an important role in frustrating the further 
development of links between Boko Haram and external terrorist groups through 
support on this issue.210 However, the region’s porous frontiers are spanned by families 
and communities, many of whom rely on border crossings for their livelihoods.211 Any 
efforts at policing boundaries must take caution not to cause damage to legitimate 
income generation for local inhabitants. Further, measures aimed at obstructing the 
movement of Boko Haram members could jeopardize the ECOWAS free movement 
agenda, inadvertently impeding the EU’s interest in promoting regional integration in 
the area. Thus, finding the correct equilibrium here poses a formidable challenge for 
any policymaker, even for an actor who has many instruments available such as the 
EU. 
 
Framing by the Government 
The preceding section underscored the challenges that the EU faces in terms of the 
nature of Boko Haram’s insurrection. Our attention now shifts to the Nigerian 
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government’s response to the insurrection, followed by an account of the 
implications of this response for the EU. Extremist interpretations of Islam are indeed 
new concepts to West Africa. However, the Nigerian government has arguably shot 
itself in the foot by painting a picture of an international jihadist threat inside its 
borders. As outlined above, Boko Haram bears much similarity to insurgencies that 
have taken place in the region over the last number of decades. Nevertheless, 
following the introduction of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act in 2011, the Nigerian 
government proscribed Boko Haram as a terrorist group in June 2013.212 During the 
same period, a state of emergency was declared in three northern states.213 Such 
moves set the scene for a heavy-handed military response. 
Pre-existing attitudes of external powers to the wider West African region no doubt 
contribute to the description of Boko Haram as terrorist threat. The US military 
previously defined the Sahel as a “breeding ground for terrorism”. 214 
Correspondingly, a former US Ambassador to the country declared in 2009 that “if 
there was a prize target for terrorism in Africa, Nigeria should be it”.215 It is also 
important to acknowledge the role that globalized communications have played in 
perpetuating such depictions. The familiarity of northern Nigerian communities with 
the ‘war on terror’ and its targets mean that hearsay labels were frequently grafted 
onto locally-rooted movements. Thus, the nickname of ‘Taliban’ was applied to 
Nigerian Islamic factions prior to any proven links between the groups. 216 
Designations such as “Afrighanistan” by international media outlets commenting on 
the region are not helpful in distinguishing fact from fiction. 217  Arguably, such 
branding has in effect created a self-fulfilling prophecy in light of recent spates of 
suicide bombings, previously unknown in the country. Additionally, the framing of 
Boko Haram in overtly religious, jihadist terms arguably paved the way for a defeatist 
viewpoint among many authorities in the deeply religious country. When queried by 
a Nigerian newspaper on suggested responses to the Boko Haram insurgency, one 
Borno State legislator responded that “there is nothing […] that has not been done”, 
adding that “presently we need prayers so that God will touch the perpetrators of 
these evils to repent, […] only God can answer our prayers.”218  
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Insufficient understandings and intelligence of the situation undoubtedly impact 
local analyses. Nonetheless, the unequivocal definition of Boko Haram as a 
transnational jihadist threat by Nigerian authorities and the subsequent insistence on 
a shortage of counter-terrorism experience and requisite resources to defeat the 
menace suggest that such framing on the part of the state is more indicative of the 
government’s desire to mobilize support for counter-measures than it is of the group’s 
actual operations and intents.219 Owing to what must be partly attributed to an 
unwillingness to take requisite costly steps to implement a rounded strategy 
incorporating economic and societal programmes, government officials at all levels 
have failed to adequately address the root of the problem. 220  Worse, in many 
respects, they have exacerbated it. 
 
The EU’s Intractability to Purported Terrorism 
While Boko Haram is demonstrably the product of numerous local factors, the group 
has subsequently shown itself to be keenly aware of international events. Therefore, 
any overt EU security engagement in Nigeria is complicated by the risk of 
compounding the very problem being addressed in three ways. Firstly, any efforts 
that succeed in curtailing extremist activities in the north of Nigeria could result in 
deeper fractionalization, closer partnership with foreign ‘brother’ organizations and 
enhanced activities outside of the Nigerian territory, 221 thus threatening the efficacy 
of the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. Such exacerbation 
occurred in Algeria, where effective counter-measures against insurgent groups led 
to a Sahelian spill-over, creating the present-day incarnation of AQIM.222 Secondly, 
although the Nigerian government is keen to lend an international profile to Boko 
Haram, this is arguably a status that it does not yet warrant, and any explicit 
involvement by external actors might motivate the group to expand its reach and 
intensify its attacks. 223  This relates to the third point, namely that international 
involvement risks provoking blowback from the group toward external targets. A 
study comparing Boko Haram threats with global activity over the course of 2012 
indicated that group elites are highly sensitive to outside events.224 The kidnapping of 
a French engineer, for example, was proclaimed by the group as a retaliation for the 
French intervention in Mali.225 Given this reactive nature, it is possible to imagine that 
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explicit European actions in northern Nigeria would raise the profile of the principals 
in question as potential targets for attack.  
Thus, while numerous commentators consider Boko Haram’s framing as a global 
terrorist threat as an express attempt of Nigerian officials to garner external support in 
tackling them, this strategy appears to have been ineffective with regard to the EU. 
In formulating the crisis as another piece of the global jihad jigsaw, it is argued that 
the Nigerian government has weakened the amenability of the situation to deeper 
EU engagement. 
 
Actions by the Government 
Disproportionate use of force by the Nigerian state from the outset has triggered 
numerous complications. Since 2009, the crude crisis response has continued to 
match carnage with chaos. Marked from the outset by ineptitude, in 2011 the 
National Security Advisor confessed that the military was ill-prepared for Boko 
Haram’s bombings and had not anticipated the scale of insurgency.226 Consequent 
intelligence efforts have continuously failed to forestall Boko Haram offensives and 
are continuously caught off guard by the group’s ambush tactics.227 
This ineptitude is matched with ignorance; President Jonathan and senior defence 
figures long stood steadfast by the belief that assaults would eventually tail off. In 
January 2012 the Chief of Defence Staff is quoted as saying that the group would 
“soon run out of idiots.” 228  However, the attacks continue to come in waves, 
demonstrating a growing capacity for organized, coordinated assaults. 229  While 
advances have been made in terms of boosting the capacity of security agencies, 
the authorities are far from well-equipped. Furthermore, the operationally defective 
response of the Nigerian authorities, including mass incidences of torture, rape, 
indeterminate incommunicado detention and extra-judicial killings 230  has 
exacerbated existing distrust and fear of the state and its security agencies among 
the Nigerian populace.231 
Additionally, the continued expansion of state-sponsored, unregulated armed 
groups is a worrisome phenomenon for any actor concerned with the rule of law. As 
such, allegations of serious human rights abuses on the side of federal authorities 
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deeply undermine efforts at containing the violent activity of Boko Haram. Militaristic 
state anti-terror campaigns belligerently slaughter both innocent civilians and 
supposed insurgents alike. Such brutality further alienates the state from the northern 
public, effectively playing into the hands of Boko Haram.232 Widespread resentment 
of the government’s heavy-handed response has reportedly fuelled local sympathy 
toward Boko Haram. 233  Thus, the state’s counter-productive response to the 
insurrection raises awkward questions for EU partners. 
 
The Inability of the EU to Engage with this Heavy Hand 
If terrorism is understood as “the calculated use of violence for political ends against 
civilian society to induce widespread and intense fear”,234 it soon becomes clear 
that state-sponsored violence is equally worrisome for external policy makers 
considering Nigeria, complicating the task of providing support. The generic EU 
approach to promote democracy and development fails here, however, as state-
sponsored insecurity caused by purported allies complicates the EU’s use of potential 
instruments for engagement.    
The role of security actors in actually causing insecurity raises serious difficulties for the 
EU and indeed any external partners involved in resolving the Nigerian crisis. 
Positioning good governance as an immediate condition for EU support to the crisis 
runs the risk of the EU being side-lined altogether in a relationship that is not marked 
by asymmetry. However, in declaring good governance as a long-term aim and 
overlooking on-going infringements of fundamental rights in response to the northern 
insurrection, the EU risks facilitating and being complicit in repressive practices of the 
state. As such, the continued implication that both Nigerian security agents as well 
as swathes of northern citizens exist in a permanent state of exception to 
international human rights law and democratic constitutions235 raises an extremely 
difficult dilemma for the EU that not even the ‘comprehensive approach’s’ extensive 
toolkit is equipped to tackle. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper sought to investigate the extent to which the EU is dealing with insecurity 
in northern Nigeria, and in turn, what factors explain this engagement. Tracing the 
evolution of the Boko Haram phenomenon, the sect’s emergent extremism is 
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attributed to the combination of regional grievances based on perceived relative 
deprivation along with links to transnational Islamist groups as well as the ill-equipped 
response of the state in the north of the country.  
Evidently, the European continent holds a vast array of interests in Nigeria. While 
these are multifaceted and widely dispersed across member states, security 
cooperation is shallow and limited to a handful of states, with only the UK 
demonstrating any real involvement in security matters. At the Union level, an 
investigation of relevant discourse, instruments and institutions confirms initial 
suspicions that while relations go beyond that of development cooperation, the EU 
does not have a strong response to Nigerian insecurity. 
Analytically, this paper sought to argue that internal preferences of key member 
states, namely the UK and France, are not a factor hindering EU engagement with 
the crisis. Rather, insecurity in Nigeria is amenable to Europeanization in light of 
evolving attitudes to bilateral foreign policy. Drawing from securitization theory, 
possible routes for the EU to engage in Nigeria at the respective levels of human, 
state and regional security were probed. Owing to both internal power dynamics, as 
well as the country’s weight as a strategic and economic power, it is reasoned that 
the unsuitability of each respective platform leaves the EU without an appropriate 
entry point through which to engage in securitization with Nigeria. Drawing out the 
particular idiosyncrasies of the Boko Haram insurrection as well as the government’s 
declaratory and operational response highlights the fact that the blend of 
instruments at the EU’s disposal are ill-suited to dealing with such an atypical conflict, 
both in terms of the political and transnational modalities of the insurgents, as well as 
the complicitness of the Nigerian state in perpetuating insecurity. 
On the European side, this research has highlighted that trade-offs must frequently 
be made in promoting stability, development and good governance. As agency on 
the African end of the equation grows stronger, such trade-offs are likely to become 
more apparent and more difficult. These challenges add import to the need for 
greater external understandings that would serve to improve decision making. 
Overall, this paper hopes to have shed further light on the multifaceted 
manifestations of contemporary global interdependencies; as noted in the 
introduction, an increasingly outward-looking African continent poses both promise 
and peril, a fact which is epitomized in EU-Nigeria relations. 
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